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Abstract 
Although the federal funds rate started rising from mid-2004 US long term rates continued to 
fall. A likely contributory factor to this ‘conundrum’ was the contemporaneous increase in US 
bond demand. Using ARDL based models, which accommodate structural breaks, this paper 
estimates the impact of foreign and domestic demand on AAA rated US bond yields in the 
‘conundrum’ period. This impact is shown to have been everywhere significantly negative. The 
fact that our model fully explains the ‘bond yield conundrum’ gives support to the hypothesis 
that the US CDO market was rapidly expanded before 2007 chiefly to absorb the overspill of 
global demand for safe assets. Moreover, our models demonstrate that there are strong linkages 
between the 10-year Treasury yield and the long term yields of AAA rated non-Treasury bonds. 
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1. Introduction 
From 2002 to mid-2007 when the US subprime crisis broke out US bond yields were at 
unusually low levels. Before mid-2004 these levels could be explained by the greater stability of 
‘fundamentals’ and low short term interest rates (the ‘great moderation’), but the persistence of 
these low yields after that point in time was puzzling. Financial markets expected long term rates 
to rise in tandem with the rise in the federal funds rate as was the case in previous periods of 
monetary tightening. This did not happen. On the contrary, not only did long term rates not rise 
they actually continued to fall
1
 (see Figure 1). As Alan Greenspan, the then Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve, stated before Congress in June 2005: “Among the biggest surprises of the past 
year has been the pronounced decline in long term interest rates on U.S. Treasury securities 
despite a 2-percentage-point increase in the federal funds rate. This is clearly without recent 
precedent. … Moreover, even after the recent backup in credit risk spreads, yields for … 
corporate bonds have declined even more than Treasuries over the same period.” (Greenspan, 
2005, p.1).  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
What caused this ‘bond yield conundrum’? Considering that its appearance coincided with a 
marked upswing in investor demand for US bonds (see Figure 2) it is possible that a considerable 
part of the downward pressure on US bond yields stemmed from that demand (Bernanke et al., 
2011). To verify this possibility, a number of empirical studies have focused specifically on the 
impact of foreign government demand for US Treasuries on long term Treasury yields. Foreign 
official investor demand began to increase after February 1994 when China devalued its 
                                                 
1 In June 2005 the long term rate was 73 basis points lower than it was one year before. In December 2006 the rate was still 
slightly lower, although the federal funds rate was 425 basis points higher than it was 2½ years earlier and expected to stay 
relatively stable above the 4% level until 2015 (Kozicki and Sellon, 2005). 
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currency, but the rate of increase in that demand accelerated even more sharply after 2003 as 
many emerging market economy governments sought to preserve part of their increasing 
commodity revenues and export surpluses in safe stores of value. While some studies found no 
evidence of a long term demand impact on Treasury yields (e.g. ECB, 2006; Rudebusch et al., 
2006), the majority of recent studies have found evidence of a negative impact, albeit that the 
estimated size of the impact varied from study to study (e.g. Idier et al., 2007; Bandholz et al., 
2009; Craine and Martin, 2009; Warnock and Cacdac Warnock, 2009, Bertaut et al., 2011). 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
In this paper we assess the impact of investor demand on long term Treasury yields using an 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) based econometric model. Since it has become well 
established that the increase in demand for US bonds stemmed not only from foreign official 
investors but also from private foreign (mainly European) and domestic investors (Bernanke et 
al., 2011) we consider the impact of all of these sources of demands on yields. Further, given 
that the ‘bond yield conundrum’ applied as much to the other major US bond markets as to the 
Treasury market, one would have expected an analysis of the impact of demand on long term 
yields in these other markets. As there has been no such analysis
2
, this paper seeks to fill this 
lacuna by modeling the impact of foreign and domestic investor demand on US agency, and 
AAA rated corporate and municipal bond yields using ARDL-based models. As an additional 
                                                 
2 To our knowledge nearly all existing studies on the ‘conundrum’ concentrate on the demand from foreign official sources on 
long term Treasury yields. Exceptions in this regard, which are however not all-encompassing as this study, are: ECB (2006) who 
test the impact of foreign official purchases on corporate bond yields and agency bond yields (without presenting their models in 
detail), Xiao and Xiao (2009) who test for the impact of pension funds on the yields of Treasuries and investment grade corporate 
bonds (without accounting for the demand from foreign sources and other domestic private investors), Warnock and Cacdac 
Warnock (2009) who test if the increase in Treasury purchases from foreign sources had a negative effect on the yield of 
corporate bonds and mortgage rates (without accounting for the demand for non-Treasury bonds), and Bertaut et al. (2011) who 
estimate the spillover impacts of foreign official purchases of Treasuries and Agency bonds on the 30-year fixed mortgage rate, 
Fanny Mae MBS yields and AAA rated corporate yield, and the impact of foreign purchases of corporate bonds on the AAA 
rated corporate bond yield (without accounting for private domestic demand). 
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novelty we also consider whether there are linkages between the 10-year Treasury bond yield 
and the long term yields of AAA rated non-Treasury bonds. 
In our view, an important by-product of this econometric assessment of the contribution of 
demand to the US ‘bond yield conundrum’ is that it may help to resolve the question as to why 
the US collateralized debt obligation (CDO) market was allowed to grow in a very short time to 
a size that was able to trigger widespread financial panic when this market suddenly collapsed in 
August 2007
3
. The conventional answer to this question is one that places the major burden of 
responsibility on the US financial system itself. However, there is a minority view that, while the 
US banks and their associates cannot be absolved from blame in accelerating the rate of 
production of CDOs right up to mid-2007, the major driving force behind that acceleration was 
the pressure of demand for US safe assets spilling over from other major US debt security 
markets (e.g. Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2009; Gros, 2009; Lysandrou, 2009; Caballero, 
2010). Clearly, this alternative view, and its ensuing policy implications, would command far 
more attention were it to be convincingly demonstrated that the rise in foreign and domestic 
demand for US bonds in the period leading up to the outbreak of the subprime crisis did indeed 
have a substantial significant negative impact on all highly rated traditional fixed income 
products. 
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section two gives details of the model specification, the 
data used and the chosen sample period. Section three presents and discusses the estimation 
results while section four briefly comments on their policy implications. Section five concludes. 
  
                                                 
3 For a good overview about the properties of CDOs and the reason why the breakdown of this market triggered the financial 
crisis see Dwyer and Tkac (2009). 
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2. Model specification and model selection 
2.1. Rationale for the models 
Any attempt to quantify the impact of demand on bond yields has to begin with a 
specification of all of the major determinants of yields. According to recent research (see e.g. 
Rudebusch et al., 2006; Wu, 2008) these determinants broadly divide into two groups, those 
relating to macroeconomic essentials on the one hand and those relating to financial risk on the 
other. Apart from the short term interest rate, which is usually expected to influence nominal 
long term yields, inflation and the business cycle are also believed to be important determinants 
of these yields (see e.g. Rudebusch and Wu, 2008; Bandholz et al., 2009; Warnock and Cacdac 
Warnock, 2009).  
Changes in actual inflation can influence expectations about the real value of future coupon 
payments, the future federal funds rate and long term inflation rates, while changes in long term 
inflation expectations influence expectations about future short term interest rates and the real 
par value at maturity. Growth expectations possibly influence long term interest rates because in 
a boom market participants often expect inflationary pressure and a rise in the federal funds rate 
to prevent an overheating of the economy and thus request higher yields, and vice versa. As 
stated, beyond these macroeconomic indicators changes in default risk and volatility can also 
influence the long term yield (see e.g. Rudebusch et al., 2006). A decrease in the volatility of 
bond yields, for example, decreases the risk for market participants and thus is expected to lower 
the yield. 
The inclusion of bond demand as a possible determinant of bond yields is not uncontroversial. 
Investor demand should have no impact on yields in a world where financial markets are 
frictionless and all assets classes are perfect substitutes (ECB, 2006). However, we shall consider 
the alternative position that financial markets are not frictionless and that bonds have certain 
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distinct properties that enable them to meet investors’ needs in ways that other asset classes 
cannot (for a clear exposition of bond characteristics and their attraction for investors see e.g. 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2007; Greenwood and Vayanos, 2010)
4
. In sum, our 
basic model can be represented by the following equation: 
 (1) 
where y
l 
denotes the long term interest rate, i
s
 the short term interest rate, π current inflation, 
πe inflation expectations, ge growth expectations and rp is a risk premium for the expected 
default risk and macroeconomic and financial volatility, while d denotes investor demand for 
bonds (in the case of the non-Treasury yields the impact of the Treasury yield is additionally 
taken into account as it is often seen as a reference for other yields). Since we consider more than 
one proxy for each explanatory factor there are up to 16 variables to be included in our model 
(see section 2.2 below). 
Given that most of these variables are non-stationary according to unreported augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests
5
 the use of models that involve stationarity inducing 
transformations, such as differencing and cointegrating linear combinations of variables, is 
desirable. Stationary vector autoregression (VAR) and vector error correction models (VECM) 
are, therefore, typically employed to assess the impact of covariates on bond yields. We do not 
employ the standard Johansen VECM cointegration method because it is well known to only be 
appropriate for a moderate number of variables (certainly less than 16) in the cointegrating 
equation and can become easily overparameterized (and overfit the data) which would 
                                                 
4 Recent research regarding the expectations hypothesis supports our view that it is possible that demand can influence long 
term yields. Sarno et al. (2007), for example, find that the expectation hypothesis can be rejected “throughout the maturity 
spectrum from one month to 10 years” (p. 82). Tang and Xia’s (2007) research confirms this finding. 
5 Even though the ADF test has low power, inspection of data plots and knowledge of the data suggest that most of our 
variables are intrinsically I(1). Exceptions are the (log of the) ISM-Index, the MOVE Index, and the corporate bond holdings 
ratio from US individuals, which are stationary according to ADF tests. 
𝑦𝑙 = 𝑓(𝑖𝑠,𝜋,𝜋𝑒 ,𝑔𝑒 , 𝑟𝑝,𝑑) 
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unacceptably reduce the degrees of freedom in our application.
6
 Further, the Johansen procedure 
requires that all variables entering the potential cointegrating equation be integrated of order one 
– which is not certain in our application.  
Widely used existing macro-finance models of the term structure (see Bernanke, Reinhart and 
Sack, 2004 [BRS hereafter]; Rudebusch et al., 2006; Rudebusch and Wu, 2008 [hereafter RW]; 
Eijffinger et al., 2010; Rudebusch, 2010) also have their limitations. VAR based macro-finance 
models such as that given in BRS involve a nonlinear estimation procedure that is implemented 
in two stages in an attempt to reduce the number of parameters that must be estimated 
nonlinearly.
7
 In the first stage a VAR (that is linear in parameters) is estimated by OLS. The 
coefficients from this model are taken as given and are used in a stochastic pricing kernel 
equation which, in the second stage, is estimated by nonlinear least squares to produce the risk 
factor loadings. Due to the large number of parameters that this estimation procedure involves, 
the number of variables included in the VAR is constrained – see Eijffinger et al. (2010). Indeed, 
this method may produce models that overfit the sample due to the large number of parameters. 
It would not be possible to estimate a BRS-type model with our data for the 16 variables that we 
wish to consider due to degrees of freedom constraints – the need to accommodate structural 
breaks would exacerbate this problem. In contrast, the ARDL method that we adopt has the 
advantage of being able to estimate all parameters simultaneously (with structural breaks) in a 
linear functional form with OLS rather than using a two-step procedure. The BRS model also has 
an issue with the internal inconsistency of forward-looking expectational variables and the 
forecasts produced by the VAR (Rudebusch et al., 2006). 
                                                 
6 Our model has potentially twice as many variables in the cointegration equation because we also allow parameter shifts in 
our equilibrium equation. 
7 As Rudebusch et al. (2006) point out “Estimation of the bond-pricing implications of the model is thus highly nonlinear and 
can be tricky in practice, with a great many local minima.” Eijffinger et al. (2010) also highlight the difficulty in optimizing the 
likelihood function with this method as well as noting the homoscedastic yields implied by this method. 
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Another form of macro-finance model that has been popular in the literature is the New 
Keynesian specification developed by RW. This method is based upon a model that uses latent 
factors, in particular the level of the yield curve and the (negative of the) yield curve slope, as the 
components of the interest rate to be modeled. This approach has been criticized because such 
factors have no economic interpretation (see Rudebusch, 2010), nevertheless RW use a form of 
this model that has economic underpinnings. That is, the slope component is based on a Taylor 
rule with a serially correlated error term while the level component reflects the medium term 
inflation target and short term variations in inflation. These components are jointly determined 
with forward-looking New Keynesian type equations for inflation and the output gap – there are 
three macroeconomic variables in the specification (interest rates, inflation and the output gap). 
This is a more structural framework that reduces the number of parameters relative to BRS such 
that it can be estimated in a single step by maximum likelihood. However, this is done at the 
expense of the number of explanatory determinants that are considered, which is relatively 
limited.
8
 
Existing models that are based upon the BRS and RW approaches have not explained much of 
the bond yield conundrum.
9
 We will employ the ARDL single equation bounds testing 
cointegration method (that corrects for weak endogeneity of regressors) introduced by Pesaran et 
al. (2001) and developed by Shin et al. (2013). Our approach seeks to explain the conundrum by 
addressing the shortcomings of these models. In particular, our ARDL model will incorporate 
(simultaneously) a much larger number of explanatory determinants than is feasible with the 
BRS and Johansen methods or that have been previously employed in RW models. Further, our 
                                                 
8 Rudebusch et al. (2006) indicate that in their application the RW model has 17 parameters to estimate compared to 125 for 
the BRS model. 
9 To our knowledge macro-finance models of the term structure of interest rates were not able to solve the ‘bond yield 
conundrum’. For a discussion of macro-finance models of the term structure of interest rates see Diebold et al. (2005) and 
Rudebusch et al. (2006). See Kim (2007) for a thorough discussion of the shortcomings of this approach. 
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model does not rely on the identification of latent factors (as with RW) that, at best, have limited 
economic underpinnings. The OLS estimation method that we use can be applied in one step and 
does not suffer from optimization problems as is the case with the BRS model. Our model can 
also be easily adapted to allow for structural shifts based upon an application of the Shin et al. 
(2013) model that incorporates cross-products of covariates and zero-one dummy variables. 
Modeling parameter shifts would not be as easily implemented, especially given the degrees of 
freedom constraints, with the other methods discussed above. 
We therefore use the single equation ARDL framework because it can incorporate a broader 
set of explanatory factors than has previously been considered whilst simultaneously accounting 
for the parameter shifts identified in the literature in a single model that can be estimated in one 
stage. Indeed, this is the only means to conduct our investigation of so many potential 
explanatory factors given current data constraints. Further, this specification turns out to be more 
successful in explaining the bond yield conundrum than the methods previously employed in the 
literature. Consequently, we use four ARDL models in (unrestricted) error correction mechanism 
form to test which of the above stated determinants were mainly responsible for the low long 
term yields of AAA rated US bonds. This approach represents a novelty of this paper. 
The general form of our models is: 
 (2) 
This modeling approach takes into account current and lagged differenced variables to 
measure short run effects and lagged level variables to account for long run effects, and it allows 
us to include all of the above stated determinants without losing too many degrees of freedom. 
Another important advantage of this modeling technique is that, in contrast to VECMs, it 
∆𝑦𝑡
𝑙 = 𝛽0 + 𝛾1𝑖∆𝑋1𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=0
+⋯+ 𝛾𝐾𝑖∆𝑋𝐾𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=0
+ 𝛼𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑙
𝑝
𝑖=1
+ 𝛼0𝑦𝑡−1
𝑙 + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑡−1
𝐾
𝑘=1
+ 𝑢𝑡  
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produces consistent estimates of the long run coefficients independently of their order of 
integration (Pesaran and Shin, 1995)
10
. This is important in our application given that unit root 
tests suggest a mixture of I(1) and I(0) variables in our model. 
 
2.2. Data 
For each of the above listed determinants a proxy is chosen that is either the same as, or 
similar to, that used in previous studies. Considering that most of the relevant data is not 
available on a daily or weekly basis, monthly data are utilized to ensure sufficient degrees of 
freedom
11
. As proxies for US long term interest rates of highly rated fixed income securities we 
take the 10-year Treasury yield (retrieved from the Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15), the 
10-year agency bond yield, and the average yield of Moody’s bond index for AAA rated 
corporate bonds and for AAA rated 10-year municipal bonds (all retrieved from Bloomberg). 
To account for changes in the US short term interest rate we include the 3-month rate for 
Eurodollar deposits in London (Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15). Following Warnock 
and Cacdac Warnock (2009), we see the Eurodollar rate as a preferable measure for changes in 
current monetary policy inasmuch as it varies more than the federal funds rate. As a proxy for 
current and expected inflation we include the trimmed personal consumption expenditure (PCE) 
deflator, following Bandholz et al. (2009), and the ten year consumer price index (CPI) inflation 
expectations, as in Warnock and Cacdac Warnock (2009). Data are taken from the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters and the Philadelphia Fed respectively. 
                                                 
10 The ARDL form that we adopt has additional advantages. First, it possesses small sample power dominance in terms of 
testing cointegration over Engle and Granger type tests and, second, the model corrects for any weak endogeneity of regressors – 
see, for example, Shin et al. (2013). A further point is that we can simultaneously estimate and test structural breaks in both the 
long run and short run components of the ARDL model in a simple manner. The application of this method with the inclusion of 
structural breaks is a novelty of this paper. 
11 While monthly series do exist for most of the data some are only available on a quarterly basis and are therefore interpolated 
to monthly frequency with the “cubic match last” method, which is readily available in EViews. The variables which have been 
interpolated are: 10-year inflation expectations, domestic bond holdings, and the data on outstanding bonds (with the exception of 
Treasuries). The available data on the expected deficit-to-GDP ratio are only published twice each year by the CBO and are 
therefore also interpolated, in line with Warnock and Cacdac Warnock (2009). 
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To capture the state of the business cycle, the purchasing manager index from the 
Manufacturing Survey of the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) is used, as in Bandholz et 
al. (2009). This is because “[f]inancial market participants have anxiously anticipated the ISM 
ever since Alan Greenspan once claimed … that he placed great emphasis on this report” 
(Trainer, 2006, p. 211). When the ISM-Index is relatively high (> 50) market participants expect 
high growth figures and when the ISM-Index is relatively low (< 43) a recession is anticipated. 
As a proxy for changes in the stock market – which is seen as a good indicator of the business 
cycle and for shifts in portfolio preferences (Idier et al., 2007) – we employ the Dow Jones Index 
(retrieved from yahoo finance). 
We use the following data to measure changes in default risk perceptions, financial market 
volatility and macroeconomic uncertainty. Default risk is captured by using data about expected 
fiscal policy, which is measured by 5-year-ahead deficit-to-GDP expectations as in Laubach 
(2009)
12
 (retrieved from the CBO Budget and Economic Outlooks) and the expected default risk 
of AAA rated corporate bonds. The latter is proxied by the Expected Default Frequency (EDF) 
for AAA rated corporate bonds (kindly provided by Moody’s Analytics UK) as in 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007). Analogous to Rudebusch et al. (2006) data from 
the Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate (MOVE) Index, retrieved from Bloomberg, are 
used to account for financial market volatility
13
. Furthermore, the 24-month rolling standard 
deviation of the Eurodollar rate, the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility (VIX) Index 
(retrieved from Bloomberg), and two measures for macroeconomic uncertainty (the 24-month 
                                                 
12 It can be difficult to measure the impact of the actual deficit-to-GDP ratio because automatic stabilizers lead to an increase 
of deficit levels in recessionary periods, while monetary easing can at the same time be expected to lower the long term yield. 
Laubach (2009) has therefore proposed using expected deficit-to-GDP ratios as these are more likely to mirror investor’s 
expectations which are important in regard to long term yields. 
13 For non-Treasury bonds the significance of the 24-month rolling standard deviations of changes in the long term yields are 
tested, similar to Warnock and Cacdac Warnock’s (2009) approach, but these proxies are insignificant. 
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rolling standard deviation of the ISM-Index and of the ten year CPI inflation expectations) are 
tested for significance, similar to Rudebusch et al. (2006). 
To measure the influence of changes in investor demand on bond yields, private and foreign 
official holdings as a ratio of total outstanding bonds are taken into account, as in Rudebusch et 
al. (2006) and Bandholz et al. (2009). The holdings ratio is preferable to mere flow or stock 
figures because demand pressure can be expected to take place only when investors increase 
their holdings disproportionally to newly available bonds (i.e. if their holdings ratio increases). 
The data for changes in the holdings from US banking institutions, US individuals and US 
institutional investors are retrieved from the Flow of Funds statistics
14
. The data for foreign 
official and foreign private long term holdings are taken from the Treasury International Capital 
Reporting System (TIC)
15
 because the Flow of Fund statistics do not distinguish between official 
and private holdings. The amount of total outstanding bonds is retrieved from the Flow of Funds 
tables and from the Treasury Bulletins (outstanding notes, bonds and TIPS). 
 
2.3. Sample Period 
Most previous studies take the mid-1980s to mid-2000s as their sample period. In contrast, we 
limit our sample period to that spanning February 1994 to June 2007 (with the exception of the 
agency bond model where the yield data are only available from 1995 onwards). February 1994 
has been chosen as the starting point because the data on foreign official holdings show a 
structural break at that time – presumably the break can be attributed to the devaluation of the 
Renminbi from 5.8 ¥/$ to 8.7 ¥/$ between December 1993 and January 1994. Another reason is 
provided by Thornton (2007) who presents evidence that a structural break might have occurred 
                                                 
14 Federal Reserve Statistical Release: Tables L209, L210, L211 and L212. 
15 Holdings in the TIC data are only reported semi-annually. Therefore, estimations from the Fed about monthly changes in 
holdings are used. The source for these data is: http://federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2007/910/ticdata.zip. 
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in 1994 when the FOMC started to release policy statements after its meetings. This change has 
influenced expectations to a significant degree (Bernanke et al., 2004). June 2007 has been 
chosen as the last observation because subprime “problems started to become evident on Wall 
Street and London in June 2007 [when] Bear Sterns’ highly leveraged mortgage-backed 
securities funds lost virtually all their value and ultimately filed for bankruptcy” (Dwyer and 
Tkac, 2009, p. 1301).
16
 
 
2.4. Model selection 
Treasury yield model. — First, we model the 10-year Treasury yield based on the variables 
described above. Due to the multitude of potential variables that could be included, the following 
model was constructed that incorporated contemporaneous differenced and level proxies of 
variables that were significant in the models of previous studies: 
 
 
  (3) 
where t indicates the current period, t-1 denotes a one month lag,   is the difference operator, 
y
l
 is the nominal 10-year Treasury yield, FO are foreign official holdings as a ratio of total 
outstanding long term Treasuries, FP are foreign private holdings as a ratio of total outstanding 
                                                 
16 To check for the robustness of our results (discussed in Section 3) we also re-estimated our parsimonious models (reported 
in Table 2 and Table 3) over two different sample periods: January 1996 to June 2007 and February 1994 to December 2005 (for 
the agency bond yield the sample is January 1995 to December 2005). Overall the models are generally stable: estimating these 8 
models over these shorter sample periods does not greatly introduce misspecification. The signs of all 91 variables are unchanged 
relative to the models estimated over the full sample period and only 13 of the 89 individually significant variables become 
insignificant at the 5% level. With regard to the demand variables only 4 out of 24 become insignificant and 3 of these have t-
ratios above 1.57 in magnitude. The other 20 demand variables remain significant and have similar magnitudes in the models 
estimated over all three time periods. We are therefore confident that our overall conclusion that investor demand is important in 
explaining the ‘bond yield conundrum’ is not biased by the sample period chosen. Indeed, when changing sample periods one 
would expect some changes in results, however, the issue is how major are these changes to the fundamental conclusions of the 
paper. We find that the changes are relatively minor and do not alter the fundamental conclusions of our paper. Hence, we present 
our results as robust. 
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long term Treasuries, P are US pension fund holdings as a ratio of total outstanding long term 
Treasuries, i is the 3-month Eurodollar rate, lism is the log of the ISM-Index, π is the actual PCE 
inflation rate, π10 are 10-year CPI inflation expectations, dow is the value of the Dow Jones 
Index, move is the MOVE Index, and def
5
 are 5-year deficit-to-GDP expectations. 
However, when estimated this model suffered from autocorrelation suggesting that the yield 
might be influenced by some differenced variables with a time lag. The monthly frequency of 
our data suggests consideration of up to twelve lags of each of the variables. However, all twelve 
differences of all of the variables in (3) could not be included simultaneously. We therefore 
added the twelve lagged differences of just one variable in (3) and, based on an F-test, excluded 
the jointly insignificant lags of the differences of this variable. This was repeated in turn for each 
of the variables in (3), including the dependent variable, until a model that included only 
significant lags of the differences of all variables was obtained. Finally, all level variables which 
were jointly not significant at the 5% level were removed from the model. 
Variable addition tests were then conducted on the following variables not included in (3): 
VIX Index and the 24-month rolling standard deviation of the Eurodollar rate, ISM-Index, and 
ten year CPI inflation – the first lagged levels and twelve lagged differences being considered for 
each factor. However, all of these variables are jointly insignificant at the 5% level, which is in 
line with the results of Rudebusch et al. (2006, p. 25) who find that from the volatility variables 
“[t]he most significant and robust explanatory variable is the implied volatility on longer-term 
Treasuries.” (i.e. the MOVE Index). The resulting model (reported as (i) in Table 2 in the Results 
section) shows no evident misspecification at the 5%-level in terms of autocorrelation (lags 
1...12), non-normally distributed residuals and heteroskedasticity [Arch (lags 1...12) and White 
tests]. According to Ramsey’s Reset test the appropriate functional form is linear and the Wu-
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Hausman test indicates that all contemporaneous variables are weakly exogenous. Further, the 
bounds test (with unrestricted intercept) – critical values are taken from Pesaran et al. (2001) – 
confirms that the level variables are mutually cointegrated irrespective of whether the regressors 
are I(0) or I(1).
17
 
18
 Hence there is no issue of spurious regression and inference from the various 
statistics (including t-ratios) is regarded as valid. 
However, unreported CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares Test indicate a structural break. This 
is in line with the findings of ECB (2006), which reports a structural change in 1999, and Wu 
(2005) who finds a structural break between 2000 and 2002.
19
 Therefore, a Quandt-Andrews 
breakpoint test (35% trimming) was undertaken. According to this test, the maximum likelihood 
for a break is in November 1998, although a break is only indicated at the 10% level. 
Considering this result and the results of past studies we believe that it is reasonable to consider 
the possibility of a break in November 1998. The main reason for the break at this time is 
probably that in 1999 the “strong accumulation of reserves” started (ECB, 2006, p. 56) while at 
the same time the holdings ratio of foreign private investors declined (with the exception of the 
period October 1999 to January 2000).   
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
                                                 
17 The F-test applied with unrestricted intercept deletes all lagged level terms (but not the intercept) from the model – the 
number of lagged level terms (excluding 𝑦
𝑡− 
𝑙
) determines the degrees of freedom. For the F-test and t-test the critical values 
corresponding to the I(1) bound are reported in the table because breaching these values confirms cointegration regardless of the 
variables’ order of integration. 
18 Pesaran et al. (2001) propose both an F-test (Wald test) and a t-test for the null of no cointegration. The t-test tests the null 
by only testing whether the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, 𝑦   
 , is zero. If the null hypothesis is false, the   
magnitude of the t-test should be large enough to reject the null. However, Pesaran et al. (2001, p. 304) point out that rejection of 
the null based on the t-ratio of 𝑦   
  does not exclude the possibility that only some (or even none) of the explanatory variables 
cointegrate with the dependent variable. This needs to be borne in mind when the bounds t-test indicates support for 
cointegration, as in our case. Further, because the t-test for cointegration does not indicate which explanatory variables, if any, 
cointegrate with 𝑦   
  the t-ratios of the lagged level variables (except 𝑦   
 ) should be interpreted with caution – they can follow 
two different limiting distributions. 
19 Other papers that identify the need to account for potential parameter changes include Eijffinger et al. (2010) and 
Rudebusch (2010). 
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To model the structural break, shift variables for all the significant independent variables were 
created with the value zero before the break and the original value of the variable after the 
break
20
. All of these shift variables were jointly included in the model. The jointly insignificant 
variables were subsequently excluded (first the shift variables and then the non-shift variables) to 
obtain the final parsimonious model. This model (reported as (ii) in Table 2) has a superior fit to 
the model without a break, no misspecification is evident and its level variables are mutually 
cointegrated
21
. Further, the CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares Test indicate no other structural 
break after November 1998 (the Quandt-Andrews test cannot be effectively applied in this model 
because of the shift variables). 
Agency, corporate and municipal yield models. — The model selection procedure for the 
other bond models is essentially the same as that for the Treasury yield model. In addition to the 
macroeconomic and risk variables that are significant in the Treasury model, the 24-month 
rolling standard deviation of changes in the long rates for each bond class and the EDF for AAA 
rated corporate bonds were tested for significance (again with lags 1...12 for the differenced 
variables). Furthermore, we also controlled for an increase in foreign and domestic investor 
demand for each bond class
22
, and considered whether the lagged level and differences of the 10-
                                                 
20 We are aware that the switch from one regime to another may occur over a period of time, perhaps in a smooth transition. 
However, to model only a one time shift provides a better approximation than to not include a shift at all (which is a shortcoming 
in other recent studies on the topic, as we will discuss in more detail at the end of the next section). Therefore, we think that our 
work is an important development and it is the best we can do at the moment taking into account the degrees of freedom problem 
that we are facing. 
21 Because the shift variables are related to the non-shift variables the degrees of freedom for the cointegration test are 
uncertain. One could, for example, either treat the shift and non-shift components of a particular variable as one covariate or two 
separate variables for calculating degrees of freedom. Following Shin et al. (2013) we consider critical values using degrees of 
freedom calculated in both of these ways, thereby forming further upper and lower bounds of the test for the already existing 
upper and lower bounds (related to uncertainty over the variables’ orders of integration). If the F-statistic (t-ratio) exceeds (is 
below) the critical value’s bound for I(1) processes treating shift and non-shift components of a variable as one (two) covariate(s) 
there is unambiguous evidence of cointegration and we use these criteria in our application. We extrapolate some of the critical 
values reported in Pesaran et al. (2001) when the number of variables used to calculate the degrees of freedom exceed 10. We 
also note that the use of this cointegration test in a model allowing for structural breaks represents one of the novelties of this 
paper. 
22 Only those investor groups that had significant holdings in June 2007 (i.e. only investor groups with a holdings ratio of 
above 1%) and that increased their holdings ratio in the respective bond class during the ‘conundrum’ period were included in 
each model. 
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year Treasury bond yield influence the long term yields of these bond classes
23
. Having 
established parsimonious models for agency, corporate and municipal bond yields, breakpoint 
tests were carried out. In line with the Treasury model, the Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test 
indicates a structural break in each non-Treasury model at least at the 10% level.
24
 The indicated 
dates of the structural breaks are relatively close to the Treasury model’s date (i.e. within a range 
of 9 month). We therefore consider the possibility of a break in the non-Treasury models by 
including shift variables in line with the procedure described above. 
The resulting parsimonious models (reported in Table 3) show no evident misspecification 
and the level variables are mutually cointegrated. All of our favored models for inference include 
shift variables and are discussed in the next section. Due to space limitations only the models 
that account for the structural break are presented for the agency, corporate and municipal bond 
yields (all of these models have a superior fit compared to those without a break). The long run 
solutions for our favored parsimonious dynamic models (with breaks) are reported in Table 4 
(the equilibrium coefficients’ standard errors are obtained as discussed in De Boef and Keele, 
2008). 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Treasury yield model 
The results of the Treasury model confirm previous findings that an increase in the demand 
from foreign governments had a negative impact on the long term Treasury yield (Table 2). 
According to our favored model for inference, model (ii), an increase in foreign government 
                                                 
23 Originally we did not include the Treasury yield as explanatory variable in our non-Treasury models. However, we found 
that the Treasury yield is highly significant and that the models including this variable exhibit both a superior fit and a lower 
Schwartz criterion. The results for the non-Treasury models excluding the Treasury yield are available upon request. 
24 We note that according to unreported Chow tests there is no structural break in June 2004, when the ‘conundrum’ period 
started, for any of the models that we report. This breakpoint is not specified with reference to the data, it is a date of a priori 
interest. 
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demand had a consistently negative impact on the 10-year US Treasury yield throughout the 
whole sample period in the short and long run. That is, ceteris paribus, an increase of the foreign 
official holdings ratio by 1% point had a negative impact on the yield of around 9 basis points 
(bp) in the long run. This magnitude is similar to the 7bp impact that Bandholz et al. (2009) and 
Bertaut et al. (2011) found in their models
25
. Foreign private investor holdings also had a 
negative impact in the long run before November 1998 but their impact became insignificant 
thereafter. The most likely explanation for this change is that although between August 1994 and 
November 1998 the holdings ratio of foreign private investors increased steadily (by a total of 
11% points), after the latter date it began to decline (for example, it declined by 3.5% points in 
the ‘conundrum’ period June 2004 to June 2007). Hence, private investors put no further demand 
pressure on the yield in the post-break period. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
All the control variables have the expected signs and reasonable magnitudes. The short term 
interest rate has a positive impact in both the short run and the long run, but after November 
1998 this impact becomes much smaller in both cases. This finding supports Stiglitz and 
Greenwald’s (2003) argument that financial innovation fostered a decoupling of long term 
interest rates from short term rates. To be specific, we find that, ceteris paribus, before 
November 1998 a 1% point increase in the short term interest rate leads to a 45bp increase in the 
Treasury yield in the long run, with this impact declining to 11bp after this date. These 
magnitudes are in line with other studies, e.g. Warnock and Cacdac Warnock (2009) who find 
                                                 
25 Bandholz et al. (2009) use total foreign Treasury holdings as measurement and Bertaut et al. (2011) use foreign official 
holdings of Treasuries and agency bonds. 
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that the impact is 37bp (but who do not consider a possible shift in the relationship between short 
term and long term interest rates).  
Higher growth expectations are also found to lead to an increase in the Treasury yield, but 
here again the impact becomes smaller after the break: thus, ceteris paribus, in the ‘conundrum’ 
period a 1% increase of the ISM Index raised the yield by about 2.5bp. This result is similar to 
Bandholz et al. (2009) who report an impact of about 2bp. In contrast, the long run impact of 
inflation, stock prices and the volatility of Treasuries on the yield remains unchanged throughout 
the whole period. Ceteris paribus, a 1% point rise in the PCE deflator increases the yield by 
94bp, a 1000 point increase in the Dow Jones Index raises the yield by 45bp (in line with Idier et 
al., 2007, who find that a 1% increase in stock returns has an impact of 42bp) and an increase of 
the MOVE Index by 10 points increases the yield by 7bp in the long term. 
In order to make these results more palpable and identify which of the variables included in 
the Treasury model (ii) were responsible for the ‘bond yield conundrum’ the marginal 
cumulative impact (MCI
26
) of each of these variables on the Treasury yield is used. June 2004 to 
June 2007 is chosen as the reference period for this exercise because it spans the beginning of 
US monetary tightening and the subsequent debate on the ‘bond yield conundrum’. The MCI of 
each variable depends on the coefficients, βγi, (including the changes due to the break where 
applicable) of the differenced and lagged level of this variable as well as the variable itself, γt. 
Thus, the formula for calculating the MCI for each month is: 
 (4) 
 (5) 
                                                 
26 The MCI is the difference in a particular variable's contribution to the yield in any particular period relative to a reference 
point (in our case May 2004). 
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Figure 3 shows that foreign official demand has the largest negative MCI on the yield in the 
reference period, which can therefore be seen as mainly responsible for the ‘conundrum’, while 
foreign private demand by contrast had virtually no impact in this period. Our model’s finding 
that the increase in foreign official Treasury holdings reduced the yield by as much as 60bp 
during the ‘conundrum’ period is similar to previous findings: Bandholz et al. (2009) report an 
impact of 70bp between 2003 and 2006, Craine and Martin (2009) one of 80bp between 2004 
and 2006, and Warnock and Cacdac Warnock (2009) one of 80bp between 1984 and May 
2005
27
. In addition to foreign official demand, pessimistic expectations about the business cycle 
(ISM Index) and a decrease of the implied yield volatility (MOVE Index) also had a negative 
impact on the Treasury yield of about 20bp each and therefore also partly explain the 
‘conundrum’. Counteracting these factors were the increases in short term interest rates and in 
core price inflation, both of which had a small positive impact of about 20bp, and the rise in 
stock prices, which had a relatively larger positive impact of almost 60bp.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
According to the implied yield of our favored model, which fits the actual Treasury yield 
remarkably well during the ‘conundrum’ period, these forces seem to explain the ‘conundrum’ 
fully (see Figure 4 for the yield residuals)
28
. Thus, our model improves upon existing Treasury 
bond models. For example, ECB (2006), Rudebusch et al. (2006), Warnock and Cacdac 
Warnock (2009), Eijffinger et al. (2010), and Rudebusch (2010) all report that their models 
                                                 
27 These reported impacts are of course influenced by the chosen reference point. If February 1994 is taken as the starting point 
foreign official demand will be found to have lowered the 10-year Treasury yield by as much as 128bp in the ‘conundrum’ 
period. However, if January 2003 is taken as the starting point the size of the impact is 70bp, exactly the amount reported in 
Bandholz et al. (2009). 
28 The residuals of the yield have been calculated as follows: actual yield – fitted yield (where fitted yieldt = Δfitted yieldt + 
actual yieldt-1). 
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overestimate the long term Treasury yield after June 2004, while Bandholz et al.’s (2009) model 
overvalues the yield throughout the year 2005
29
.  
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
The reason why our model appears to explain the Treasury yield ‘conundrum’ better than 
previous models most likely lies in our different modeling strategy. In contrast to the previous 
literature, we consider more variables in our model (whilst accounting for non-stationarity) and 
we model the evident structural break. Indeed, Rudebusch et al. (2006), Eijffinger (2010), and 
Rudebusch (2010) use a VECM model that does not directly include foreign official demand
30
, 
which our model found to be the most important variable in explaining the ‘conundrum’. 
Furthermore, the above authors do not take into account the possibility that the impact of the 
short term interest rate on the 10-year Treasury yield during the ‘conundrum’ period was smaller 
than before November 1998. 
The incorporation of this possibility in our model also seems to provide a major explanation 
of why it fits the yield better than do the models of Bandholz et al. (2009) and Warnock and 
Cacdac Warnock (2009). These authors’ models attribute a higher impact than our model does to 
the short term interest rate during the ‘conundrum’ period (with long run coefficients of 0.37 and 
0.33, respectively). An additional point is that these authors’ studies appear to overestimate the 
yield either because they do not include a measure for interest rate volatility (Bandholz et al.) or 
because they use the rolling standard deviation of long yields to proxy the volatility of yields 
                                                 
29 Not all existing studies report their model residuals, see e.g. Idier et al. (2007), and Craine and Martin (2009). 
30 Rudebusch et al. (2006) test if foreign official demand is correlated with the error term of their model, and find no 
correlation – they use custodial data from the New York Fed (FRBNY) as a proxy for foreign official holdings; this seems not be 
the best proxy because “… some foreign governments avoid the FRBNY and thus this source is best described as only partial” 
(Warnock and Cacdac Warnock 2009, p. 905). However, this finding does not imply that the model results would be the same if 
the variable is fully incorporated in the model. 
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(Warnock and Cacdac Warnock) – in contrast to the MOVE Index, the rolling standard deviation 
does not indicate a decline in volatility during the ‘conundrum’ period. 
 
3.2. Agency, corporate and municipal bond yield models 
The results of the agency, corporate and municipal yield models clearly indicate that investor 
demand played a major role in explaining the low long term yields of non-Treasury AAA rated 
bonds (Table 3 and Table 4). In line with the Treasury yield model, these models fit the data well 
in the ‘conundrum’ period (see Figure 4), and all control variables have the expected signs. 
However, in some cases the magnitudes notably differ. Next to noise, the most likely explanation 
for this observation is that investors do not see these different bond classes as perfect substitutes 
and therefore ask for different adjustments in prices when conditions are changing. Indeed, 
previous studies confirm that investors value different bond classes differently even while they 
may carry the same credit rating (see e.g. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenson, 2007). A likely 
explanation for why the impact of the control variables is lower than in the Treasury equation is 
that part of their impact is indirectly captured via the inclusion of the 10-year Treasury yield in 
the non-Treasury yield models (where the former is influenced by the same control variables as 
the latter). The additional control variable, the proxy for default risk of AAA rated corporate 
bonds (EDFAAA), has a reasonable magnitude as we will see below. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Agency bond yield. — Foreign official demand had a negative impact not only on the Treasury 
yield but also on the agency bond yield, though only in the short run (Table 3, column 1). By 
contrast, an increase in the demand from foreign private and US individual investors has 
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negative short and long term effects on the 10-year agency bond yield, while the demand from 
US pension funds only has negative long term effects (Table 3 and Table 4, column 1). All 
demand variables remain stable over the whole sample period. The immediate effect of an 
increase in the holdings ratio of foreign official investors by 1% point was a reduction of the 
agency yield by 98bp. Each 1% point increase in the foreign private holdings ratio led to a 
decline in the yield of around 21bp in the long run, while the same increase in the domestic 
pension fund and individual holdings ratio lowered the yield by around 10bp and 3bp, 
respectively. Possible explanations as to why the magnitudes of the coefficients of these investor 
groups were so different are that they reacted differently to expected changes in the agency yield 
or that they had different expectations of future yields. US individual investors, for example, 
might have increased their holdings to a lesser extent than foreign private investors when they 
(rightly) expected the agency yield to decrease and hence put less additional pressure on yields 
than their counterparts. 
Changes in the Treasury yield are also very important in explaining changes in the agency 
yield: a 1% point decrease in the 10-year Treasury yield lowers the 10-year agency yield by 87bp 
in the long term and by around 103bp in the short term, i.e. changes in the Treasury yield are 
nearly transmitted one to one to the agency yield. This result indicates that investors see agency 
bonds as a very close substitute for Treasury bonds. 
The MCI suggests that between June 2004 and mid-2005 the fall of the 10-year Treasury yield 
was the main reason for the low long term agency yield (up to -64bp), while after October 2005 
investor demand became the main depressing force (up to -72bp). In contrast to the Treasury 
yield model most of the time private investors had a similar negative impact on the yield than 
foreign official investors. The downward pressure on yields, further fuelled by a lowering of the 
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implied yield volatility (up to -23bp), was partly offset by the rise in the short term interest rate, 
and by the increase in stock prices and in core price inflation (Figure 5). 
 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
 
Corporate bond yield. — Foreign private investors invested heavily in the corporate bond 
market between 1994 and mid-2007, their holdings ratio more than doubling (from 11% to 
24.5%) during this period, with the result that they put significant downward pressure on AAA 
rated corporate bond yields in the short run (Table 3, column 2) and in the long run (Table 4, 
column 2). Regarding the long run, an increase in the foreign private investors’ holdings ratio by 
1% point led to a decrease of the yield by about 6bp. As in the agency yield model, US 
individual investor holdings also had a negative impact on the yield when they increased their 
holdings ratio (about 5bp in the long run). Additionally, an increase in the holdings ratio of banks 
lowered the corporate bond yield in the short run. 
Interestingly, the impact of the 10-year Treasury yield on the corporate bond yield is around 
20bp lower than in the agency yield model (i.e. a 1% point increase in the former ‘only’ leads to 
a 67bp increase of the later in the long term and a 82bp increase in the short term). In other 
words, seemingly AAA rated corporate bonds are not as close a substitute for Treasuries as 
agency bonds are. 
In line with the agency bond MCIs, the nominal AAA rated corporate bond yield MCIs shows 
that initially the drop in the 10-year Treasury yield was the main factor in explaining the low 
long term corporate bond yields, while after some time investor demand became the main 
suppressing force (Figure 6). Between June 2004 and June 2007 the yield of AAA rated 
corporate bonds was lowered by as much as 28bp due to the decline of the Treasury yield and by 
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as much as 19bp due to an increase in the demand pressure from foreign and domestic private 
investors. Lower yield volatility and especially a lower default risk for AAA rated corporate 
bonds added significantly to this pressure. The main counteracting force was the increase in the 
short term interest rate. 
 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
 
Municipal bond yield. — Finally, an increase in foreign and domestic private demand for 10-
year AAA rated municipal bonds also had a negative long term impact on their yield. It appears 
that a 1% point increase in the holdings ratio of foreigners decreased the municipal bond yield by 
20bp (Table 4, column 3). In addition, domestic individual investors and insurance companies 
put downward pressure on the yield in the magnitude of 4bp and 10bp, respectively, when they 
increased their holdings ratios by 1% point (the differences in the impact possibly stemming 
from different expectations or from differences in the reactions to expectations as previously 
argued). These long term impacts are stable over the whole period. 
Changes in the 10-year Treasury yield also have a significant impact, i.e. a 1% point increase 
in the Treasury yield led to a 44bp increase in the municipal bond yield. One possible reason 
why the impact is notably smaller than in the other two non-Treasury models is the special tax 
status of municipal bonds
31
, which makes a direct comparison with other bond yields 
complicated and means that investors probably see municipal bonds as the least best Treasury 
substitute (in comparison with agency and AAA rated corporate bonds). Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to note that the short term impact of changes in the Treasury yield on the municipal 
                                                 
31 The income on most municipal bonds is tax-exempt. This special tax treatment of municipal bonds means that the average 
yield of municipal bonds is normally lower than that of Treasury, corporate and agency bonds with the same maturity, because 
“short-maturity municipal yields are equal to the Treasury yield multiplied by one minus the income tax rate, and the ratio 
between municipal and Treasury yields decreases with maturity.” (Ang et al., 2010, p. 566). 
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yield became much stronger after the break in June 1999, i.e. in the short term the municipal 
bond yield became more dependent on the Treasury yield in the post-break period. 
The findings for the municipal bond MCIs are similar to those reported previously. In the first 
‘conundrum’ period month the decrease in the 10-year Treasury yields mostly explains why the 
municipal bond yield has decreased, whereas afterwards investor demand (up to -19bp impact) 
together with a decrease in the interest rate volatility (up to -13bp impact) are the major 
depressing factors. A puzzling result is the slightly negative MCI of the DOW Jones Index and 
the PCE deflator. This may be explained by the fact that according to the model a change in 
these variables only has a short term impact on the yield (i.e. although the Dow Jones Index and 
the PCE deflator increase in the long run, their monthly change was not mainly positive). The 
increase in the short term interest rate was therefore the only counteracting force against the 
downward pressure on the yield. 
 
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
 
Our main finding is that investor demand from foreign official and foreign and domestic 
private sources is crucial to explain the bond yield ‘conundrum’ in all traditional AAA rated US 
long term bond markets. The increase in foreign official demand seemingly not only had a direct 
negative impact on the Treasury (and agency) yield but also an indirect impact on non-Treasury 
yields (especially between mid-2004 and the end of 2005): Figure 3 shows that most of the 
downward pressure on the 10-year Treasury yield stemmed from the increasing demand of 
foreign official investors. A lower Treasury yield, in turn, had a negative impact on the other 
yields (as reported above). Therefore, the increase in foreign official demand for 10-year 
Treasury bonds also, indirectly, lowered the yield of other bonds via its negative impact on the 
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Treasury yield. A second interesting finding is that the 10-year Treasury yield indeed can be seen 
as a benchmark for other long term bond yields. This is especially true for the agency bond yield. 
 
4. Investor demand and the subprime crisis 
The US ‘bond yield conundrum’ has generated much discussion regarding its magnitude and 
the factors behind it for good reason. As Wu (2008) has argued: “The correct understanding and 
quantification of the conundrum have direct implications for monetary policy…” (p. 2). While 
we certainly agree with this argument we also believe that a ‘correct understanding and 
quantification of the conundrum’ as manifested in all of the major US bond markets – and not 
merely in the market for Treasuries – can help to shed more light on the root causes of the recent 
financial crisis and, in so doing, help guide policy makers in their attempts to prevent a similar 
crisis on this scale in the future. The logic behind this position is straightforward. 
The securities at the epicenter of the financial crisis that broke out in the summer of 2007 
were CDOs. The estimated amount of CDOs in 2002 was about $
1
/4 trillion and yet by the time 
of the crisis that figure had multiplied twelvefold to about $3 trillion with the bulk of it 
comprising of AAA rated tranches (Blundell-Wignall, 2007)
32
. One of the unresolved questions 
regarding this rapid increase in the CDO market concerns the precise role played by investor 
demand. Did this demand play a merely passive role? Yields in the other debt securities markets 
were unusually low in the immediate pre-crisis period and so investors would have been happy 
to accept the higher yielding CDOs, but was the quest for fees and commissions on the part of 
the banks and their associates the more important driving force behind the rapid acceleration in 
                                                 
32 The rapid growth of the securitisation market meant that the subprime mortgage market also had to grow strongly, which 
lead to a dramatic deterioration of the loan quality and performance and subsequently to the collapse of the market (see e.g. 
Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011).  
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CDO production? Or did investor demand play a more active role in the growth of the CDO 
market? The US financial institutions may have profited handsomely from the creation and 
distribution of CDOs but were these institutions also under enormous external pressure to do all 
of this in order to make up for the shortfall in the supply of other US safe assets? 
If the answer to the above question is that investor demand did indeed play a secondary role in 
CDO growth then it is entirely correct for policy makers to concentrate their efforts on rectifying 
the various institutional and regulatory errors and failures that allowed the US banking system to 
create the toxic debt securities on so large a scale in such a short time span. However, this policy 
approach would not on its own prevent future financial crises if it turned out that the demand for 
extra safe assets was in fact the more important driver behind CDO growth, as recent research 
from Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) suggests. From this alternative, demand-side, 
perspective on CDO growth “the core policy problem to deal with is how to bridge the safe asset 
gap without over-exposing the financial sector to systemic risk.” (Caballero, 2010, p. 6). Thus, 
imposing various new rules and restrictions on the US financial sector’s ability to create debt 
assets will not only “...not help to deal with the structural problem of excess safe-asset demand.” 
but will also have the opposite effect of worsening the safe asset gap, the potential “...cost of this 
policy distortion [being] stronger headwinds for the recovery and the risk that the same pattern of 
systemically-vulnerable safe-asset creation may migrate to somewhere else in the world that is 
even less prepared to absorb the systemic risk.” (ibid, p. 6-7). 
Caballero’s take on the major policy lessons of the subprime crisis remains a minority one and 
a possible reason for this is that to date there has been no comprehensive attempt at 
econometrically testing the strength of foreign and domestic demand for US safe assets in the 
pre-crisis era. The crux of the matter is that CDOs are essentially ‘second-floor’ debt securities, 
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securities backed by securities. Thus, for the demand-pull version of the CDO growth story to be 
really credible, it has to be convincingly demonstrated that the pressure of aggregate demand for 
safe stores of value was so great that the combined capacity of all the US ‘ground floor’ debt 
securities markets (those for corporate and municipal securities in addition to that for Treasuries) 
and of the US ‘first floor’ securities markets (those for agency and other asset backed securities) 
was simply not large enough to fully accommodate that pressure. We believe that the 
econometric results generated in this paper amount to such a demonstration insofar as they 
consistently point to significant and substantial downward demand pressure on all US bond 
yields in the pre-crisis period. This is especially true if one takes into account that the US long 
term non-Treasury yields were also reduced by the low 10-year Treasury yield, which, in turn, 
was negatively influenced by the increase in foreign official investor demand for Treasury bonds. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Our models fully explain the US ‘bond yield conundrum’ of 2004 to 2007 as found not only 
in relation to US Treasuries but also in relation to all of the other traditional AAA rated US debt 
securities, something that has not been achieved in the previous literature. We attribute this result 
to the incorporation of a broader set of variables than is usual in our models, this being made 
possible by the adoption of the ARDL approach, and to the allowance for evident structural 
change at the end of the 1990s (the latter confirming findings of previous authors). We find that 
long term non-Treasury yields are significantly influenced by the 10-year Treasury yield and that 
the latter is important to explain the low pre-crisis long term yields of the former (the 10-year 
Treasury yield lowered non-Treasury yields by up to 64bp in the ‘conundrum’ period). This is 
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especially true for 10-year agency bonds that investors seemingly regarded as the closest 
substitute for 10-year Treasury bonds.  
We furthermore find that, if one accounts for the negative indirect effect of foreign official 
investor demand on non-Treasury yields via their depressing effects on the Treasury yield, 
investor demand seemingly is the most prominent factor in explaining the unusually low long 
term US bond yields in the ‘conundrum’ period. The direct negative impact of foreign official 
investor demand was up to 60bp in absolute value in the case of the 10-year Treasury yield and 
up to 43bp in the case of the 10-year agency bond yield, whereas foreign and domestic private 
demand reduced the 10-year agency bond yield by up to 29bp in absolute value, and the AAA 
rated long term corporate and municipal bond yields by up to 19bp. This finding has substantial 
policy implications in that it provides support for the hitherto underexplored hypothesis that next 
to regulatory and market failures an excess safe asset demand on the part of investors was a chief 
force that drove the expansion of the US CDO market well beyond what was prudent.  
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Table 1 
Quandt-Andrews unknown breakpoint test results.
a 
 Treasury model Agency model Corporate model Municipal model 
Max Likelihood Ratio F-statistic prob 0.062 0.092 0.018 0.086 
Date 1998.11 1999.08 1998.07 1999.06 
a 
This table shows the results of the Quandt-Andrews unknown breakpoint tests (35% trimmed data, probabilities 
calculated using Hansen’s (1997) method). The presented figures are F-statistic probabilities and the dates of the 
breakpoints. 
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Table 2 
Parsimonious model of the nominal 10-year Treasury yield.
a
 
 
a 
This table summarizes the results of our ARDL-model for the nominal 10-year Treasury yield. Where ∆ is the 
difference operator, the number of lags are indicated in parentheses as a suffix to a variable’s name, s11/98 indicates 
the shift component of a variable and the date of the structural break (i.e. after November 1998), YIELD is the 10-
year nominal Treasury yield, FOROFFICIAL are foreign official holdings as a ratio of total outstanding long-term 
Treasuries, FORPRIVATE are foreign private holdings as a ratio of total outstanding long-term Treasuries, 
EURDOL is the 3-month Eurodollar rate, LOGISM is the log of the ISM-Index, PCE is the actual PCE inflation rate, 
CPI10Y are 10-year CPI inflation expectations, DOW is the value of the Dow Jones Index, and MOVE is the Merrill 
Lynch Option Volatility Estimate Index. Intercepts are not reported but are included in the models. In each column 
coefficients and t-statistics (in parenthesis) are reported. Probability values for all misspecification tests are reported 
in the section headed misspecification/cointegration tests, where BG(x) denotes the probability value of the Breusch-
Godfrey test for x order correlation and Arch(x) the probability value of the ARCH heteroskedasticity test with x 
lags. The 5% critical values for the bounds cointegration test with unrestricted intercept and no trend are (i) F=3.39, 
t=-4.72, (ii) F=3.50, t=-5.03 [(i) k=8, (ii) k=10 (t), k=7 (F)] – see Pesaran et al. (2001). The significance of a 
coefficient or test statistic at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
∆(FOROFFICIAL) -0.2174*** (-6.44) -0.2155*** (-6.81)
∆(FOROFFICIAL(-1)) -0.1273*** (-3.58) -0.1325*** (-4.11) FOROFFICIAL -0.0944*** (-7.14)
∆(EUR_DOL)   0.3279***   (3.42)   0.7202***   (4.38) FORPRIVATE -0.2396*** (-5.82
∆(EURDOL)s11/98 -0.5256*** (-2.98) EURDOL   0.4478***   (4.50)
∆(EURDOL(-1)) -0.2459*** (-2.62) -0.1630* (-1.78) LOGISM   3.3286***   (5.52)
∆(LOGISM)   0.9202**   (2.31)   1.0200***   (2.65) PCE   0.9426***   (3.72)
∆(LOGISM(-1))   1.1464***  (3.17)   1.6376***  (2.86) DOW   0.0005***   (5.56)
∆(LOGISM(-1))s11/98 -1.2539* (-1.80) MOVE   0.0070***   (2.88)
∆(LOGISM(-4))   1.0097***   (2.83)   0.8844***   (2.66)
∆(PCE)   0.5404***   (2.72)   0.5403***   (2.90) FOROFFICIAL -0.0944*** (-7.14)
∆(PCE(-9)) -0.6486*** (-2.98) -0.6432*** (-3.12) FORPRIVATE   0.0038   (0.07)
∆(DOW)   0.0001**   (2.36)   0.0001**   (3.14) EURDOL   0.1113***  (2.85)
∆(DOW(-1))   0.0001**   (2.50) LOGISM   2.5283***   (3.61)
YIELD(-1) -0.2835*** (-6.13) -0.3795*** (-6.63) PCE   0.9426***   (3.72)
FOROFFICIAL(-1) -0.0224*** (-3.46) -0.0358*** (-4.67) DOW   0.0005***   (5.56)
FORPRIVATE(-1) -0.0252** (-2.07) -0.0909*** (-6.50) MOVE   0.0070***   (2.88)
FORPRIVATE(-1)s11/98   0.0924***   (3.62)
EURDOL(-1)   0.0535***   (3.36)   0.1700***   (3.45)
EURDOL(-1)s11/98 -0.1277*** (-2.73)        (i)    (ii)
LOGISM(-1)   0.8877***   (2.91)   1.2634***   (4.69) BG(2) prob.      0.16   0.24
LOGISM(-1)s11/98   0.3038** (-2.29) BG(12) prob.      0.25   0.36
PCE(-1)   0.2431**   (2.28)   0.3578***   (3.28) Jarque-Bera prob.      0.44   0.26
CPI10Y(-1)   0.3855**   (2.05) Arch(1) prob.      0.90   0.56
DOW(-1)   0.0001***   (3.53)   0.0002***   (5.88) Arch(12) prob.      0.56   0.49
MOVE(-1)   0.0021**   (2.27)   0.0027***   (2.78) White prob.      0.34   0.61
adj. R-squared 0.58 0.64 Ramsey LR prob.      0.87   0.15
Schwarz criterion -0.47 -0.54 Wu-Hausm. prob.      0.85   0.58
Sample: 1994:02 to 2007:06 (161 observations) Bounds test F-stat.   6.44***   8.20***
Bounds test t-stat. -6.13*** -6.63***
after the break
(iii) equilibrium long-run effects of (ii)(ii) with break(i) without break
before the break
misspecification/cointegration tests
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Table 3 
Parsimonious model of the nominal long term yields of AAA-rated non-Treasury 
US securities. 
a
 
 
a This table summarizes the results of our ARDL-models for the nominal 10-year US agency, and AAA-rated corporate and 
municipal bond yields, respectively. The table notes are the same as in Table 2, with the following exceptions: sx/x indicates the 
shift component of a variable with the date of the structural break indicated by x/x (i.e. after July 1998, June 1999 and August 
1999 respectively), YIELD is the nominal AAA-rated long-term yield of the respective bond class, FOROFFICIAL are foreign 
official holdings as a ratio of total outstanding bonds (i.e. the holdings ratio) of the respective bond class, FORPRIVATE is the 
foreign private holdings ratio of the respective bond class, FOREIGN is the foreign holdings ratio of municipal bonds, USBANK 
is the US banking institutions holdings ratio of the respective bond class, USINDIVIDUAL is the US individual holdings ratio of 
the respective bond class, USINSURANCE is the US insurance companies holdings ratio of municipal bonds, USPENSION is the 
US pension funds holdings ratio of agency bonds, and EDFAAA is Moody’s expected default frequency for AAA-rated corporate 
bonds. The 5% critical values for a Bounds cointegration test with unresticted intercept and no trend are (i) f=3.30, t=-4.88, (ii) 
f=3.30, t=-4.88, (iii) f=3.50, t=-4.57 [(i) k=9, (ii) k=9, (iii) k=7] - see Pesaran et al. (2001). 
∆(YIELD(-1)) -0.2040*** (-3.65) ∆(YIELD(-1))   0.14119*** (2.93) ∆(YIELD(-5))   0.1203***   (2.66)
∆(Treasury)   1.0281*** (15.81) ∆(TREASURY)   0.82246*** (27.48) ∆(TREASURY)   0.4098***   (6.27)
∆(FOROFFICIAL) -0.9842*** (-4.85) ∆(TREASURY)s07/98 -0.21796*** (-5.57) ∆(TREASURY)s06/99   0.3047***   (3.71)
∆(FOROFFICIAL(-2))   0.7620***   (3.23) ∆(TREASURY(-1)) -0.13919***   (-3.53) ∆(TREASURY(-1)) -0.0838*   (-1.87)
∆(FOROFFICIAL(-3)) -0.7264*** (-2.99) ∆(FORPRIVATE)s07/98 -0.13186*** (-5.32) ∆(EURDOL)   0.2857***   (4.34)
∆(FORPRIVATE) -0.3363***   (-3.50) ∆(FORPRIVATE(-6))   0.03100*   (1.70) ∆(PCE)   0.3924***   (2.95)
∆(USINDIVIDUALS) -0.0691** (-2.23) ∆(US INDIVIDUAL(-1)) -0.03740** (-2.45) ∆(DOW(-12))   0.0001*   (1.95)
∆(EURDOL(-1))   0.2302***   (2.85) ∆(US INDIVIDUAL(-4))   0.05858***   (4.19) ∆(MOVE)   0.0014*   (1.73)
∆(PCE)   0.4269***   (2.62) ∆(USBANK(-1)) -0.19577***   (-4.54) ∆(MOVE(-12))   0.0015**   (2.10)
∆(CPI10y(-10))   1.2528***   (3.38) ∆(USBANK(-10))   0.09487***   (2.89) YIELD(-1) -0.6707*** (-9.66)
∆(DOW(-1))s08/99   0.0001***   (2.66) ∆(EURDOL(-8))s07/98 -0.16637*** (-5.51) TREASURY(-1)   0.2927***   (7.03)
∆(MOVE)   0.0031***   (3.19) ∆(EURDOL(-11))   0.08526***   (3.33) FOREIGN(-1) -0.1338*** (-2.80)
YIELD(-1) -0.6083*** (-6.80) ∆(LOGISM(-2))s07/98   0.60430***   (4.51) USINDIVIDUAL(-1) -0.0292*** (-4.59)
TREASURY(-1)   0.5280*** (5.71) ∆(DOW(-1))s07/98 -0.00005*** (-3.93) USINSURANCE(-1) -0.0685*** (-4.59)
FORPRIVATE(-1) -0.1285*** (-3.27) ∆(DOW(-10))   0.00003*** (3.27) EURDOL(-1)   0.0831***   (5.72)
USPENSION(-1) -0.0578* (-1.85) ∆(MOVE)   0.00119*** (3.38) MOVE(-1)   0.0020**   (2.47)
USINDIVIDUAL(-1) -0.0188* (-1.84) ∆(EDFAAA)   0.96821** (2.35) adj. R-squared 0.69
EURDOL(-1)   0.0507***   (2.62) ∆(EDFAAA(-5)) -1.25693*** (-3.22) Schwarz criterion -1.17
PCE(-1)   0.2862***   (3.66) YIELD(-1) -0.18422***   (-7.58) Sample: 1994:02 to 2007:06 (161 obs.)
DOW(-1)   0.0001***   (4.50) TREASURY(-1)  0.12417***   (6.46)
MOVE(-1)   0.0044***   (4.04) FORPRIVATE(-1) -0.01174**   (-2.36)
adj. R-squared 0.82 USINDIVIDUAL(-1) -0.01003**   (-2.47)
Schwarz criterion -0.78 EURDOL(-1)   0.03135***   (5.54)
Sample: 1995:02 to 2007:06 (149 obs.) PCE(-1)   0.05994* (1.96)
Sample: 1995:02 to 2007:06 (149 obs.) DOW(-1)   0.00002***   (3.42)
MOVE(-1)   0.00164***   (4.37)
EDFAAA(-1)   1.73047***   (6.70)
adj. R-squared 0.94
Schwarz criterion -2.70
Sample: 1994:02 to 2007:06 (161 obs.)
(iii) Municipal
Results misspecification/cointegration tests
BG(2) prob.: (i) 0.29, (ii) 0.61, (iii) 0.98       BG(12) prob.: (i) 0.31, (ii) 0.06, (iii) 0.09         Jarque-Bera prob.: (i) 0.38, (ii) 0.19, (iii) 0.09
(i) Agency (ii) Corporate
Bounds test: F-stat. (i) 6.54***, (ii) 12.27***, (iii) 14.26***; t-stat. (i) -6.80***, (ii) -7.58***, (iii) -9.66***
Arch(1) prob.: (i) 0.45, (ii) 0.41, (iii) 0.30     Arch(12) prob.: (i) 0.42, (ii) 0.80, (iii) 0.08      White prob.:  (i) 0.36, (ii) 0.06, (iii) 0.33
Ramsey LR prob.: (i) 0.55, (ii) 0.17, (iii) 0.80      Wu-Hausman Prob.: F-stat. (i) 0.84, (ii) 0.89, (iii) 0.77
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Table 4 
Equilibrium long run impacts on the nominal long term yields of AAA-rated 
non-Treasury US securities. 
a
 
 
a
 This table summarizes the equilibrium results of our ARDL-models for the nominal 10-year US agency, and AAA-
rated corporate and municipal bond yields, respectively. The table notes are the same as in Table 2 and Table 3. 
 
  
TREASURY   0.8679*** (15.62) TREASURY   0.6740*** (11.66) TREASURY   0.4364*** (12.12)
FORPRIVATE -0.2112*** (-3.73) FORPRIVATE -0.0637***   (-2.66) FOREIGN -0.1995*** (-2.88)
USPENSION -0.0951** (-2.11) USINDIVIDUAL -0.0544***   (-2.61) USINDIVIDUAL -0.0436*** (-5.33)
USINDIVIDUAL -0.0308* (-1.94) EURDOL   0.1702***   (4.88) USINSURANCE -0.1021*** (-5.32)
EURDOL   0.0834***   (2.82) PCE   0.3254**   (2.14) EURDOL   0.1239***   (6.55)
PCE   0.4704***   (4.19) DOW   0.0001***   (3.65) MOVE   0.0030**   (2.44)
DOW   0.0001***   (4.54) MOVE   0.0089***   (4.89)
MOVE   0.0072***   (4.10) EDFAAA   9.3936***   (8.22)
TREASURY   0.8679*** (15.62) TREASURY   0.6740*** (11.66) TREASURY   0.4364*** (12.12)
FORPRIVATE -0.2112*** (-3.73) FORPRIVATE -0.0637***   (-2.66) FOREIGN -0.1995*** (-2.88)
USPENSION -0.0951** (-2.11) USINDIVIDUAL -0.0544***   (-2.61) USINDIVIDUAL -0.0436*** (-5.33)
USINDIVIDUAL -0.0308* (-1.94) EURDOL   0.1702***   (4.88) USINSURANCE -0.1021*** (-5.32)
EURDOL   0.0834***   (2.82) PCE   0.3254**   (2.14) EURDOL   0.1239***   (6.55)
PCE   0.4704***   (4.19) DOW   0.0001***   (3.65) MOVE   0.0030**   (2.44)
DOW   0.0001***   (4.54) MOVE   0.0089***   (4.89)
MOVE   0.0072***   (4.10) EDFAAA   9.3936***   (8.22)
before the break
after the break after the break
before the break
after the break
before the break
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Long and short term interest rates in the US (in %) 
 
Fig. 1. The top plot compares the 3-month Eurodollar rate with the 10-year Treasury yield. The bottom plot 
demonstrates the downward movement of traditional long-term bond yields in the US (Sources: Bloomberg, 2010, 
FR Statistical Release H.15, 2010). 
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Foreign official holdings (US$ bn) 
 
Foreign private holdings (US$ bn) 
 
US private investor holdings (US$ bn) 
 
Fig. 2. US bond holdings from foreign and private domestic investors. The plots show the US bond holdings of 
foreign governments (top), foreign private investors (middle) and domestic private investors (bottom), respectively 
(Sources: FR Statistical Release Z.1, 2010, Treasury International Capital System, 2010). 
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Variables’ MCIs for the nominal 10-year Treasury yield 
 
Fig. 3. These plots show the marginal cumulative impact of the demand variables on the nominal 10-year Treasury 
yield for each month during the conundrum period, according to the results of our Treasury yield model (see Table 
2, column 2). 
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Yield residuals 
 
Fig. 4. These plots show how well the implied yield values of the respective models fit the respective long-term 
bond yields. 
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Variables’ MCIs for the nominal 10-year agency bond yield 
 
Fig. 5. These plots show the marginal cumulative impact of each variable on the nominal 10-year agency bond yield 
for each month during the conundrum period, according to the results of our agency yield model (see Table 3, 
column 1).  
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Variables’ MCIs for the nominal AAA-rated corporate bond yield 
 
Fig. 6. These plots show the marginal cumulative impact of each variable on the nominal average AAA-rated 
corporate bond yield for each month during the conundrum period, according to the results of our corporate yield 
model (see Table 3, column 2). 
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Variables’ MCIs for the nominal AAA-rated municipal bond yield 
 
Fig. 7. These plots show the marginal cumulative impact of each variable on the nominal 10-year municipal bond 
yield for each month during the conundrum period, according to the results of our municipal yield model (see Table 
3, column 3). 
 
 
